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Abstract 
This article takes stock of major developments in the political economy of 
contemporary Venezuela after ten years under Hugo Chávez. It is argued that 
the Bolivarian process has done a great deal to rejuvenate the international 
critique of neoliberalism and to bring discussion of socialism back on the 
agenda of the Left. At the same time, there has been no socialist revolution in 
Venezuela, and Chavismo is ridden with profound and abiding contradictions. 
This article considers the historical backdrop of the Bolivarian process, 
beginning with the end of authoritarianism and the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 
rise and fall of orthodox neoliberalism at the end of the twentieth-century. 
The article then describes Chavez’ gradual and partial radicalization between 
1999 and 2009 and finally concludes that the global economic crisis poses a 
unique set of challenges and opportunities for the Bolivarian process in the 
midst of significantly reduced oil revenues. 
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Résumé  
Cet article analyse les développements majeurs dans l’économie politique du 
Venezuela contemporain après dix ans sous Hugo Chávez. Il défend l’idée que 
le processus Bolivarien a considérablement revivifié la critique internationale 
du néolibéralisme et a remis le débat sur le socialisme sur l’agenda de la 
Gauche. En même temps, il n’y a pas eu de révolution socialiste au Venezuela 
et le Chavisme est marqué par des profondes contradictions structurelles. Cet 
article retrace les évènements historiques qui ont précédé le processus 
Bolivarien, en commençant avec la fin de l’autoritarisme et le pacte de Punto 
Fijo et la montée puis la chute du néoliberalisme orthodoxe à la fin du 
vingtième siècle. Ensuite, cet article décrit la radicalisation graduelle et 
partielle de Chavez entre 1999 et 2009 et conclut que la crise économique 
mondiale représente des défis et opportunités pour le processus Bolivarien 
en particulier compte tenu des revenus pétroliers significativement réduits. 
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Elected in late December 1998, Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency of 
Venezuela in February 1999.1  A decade into the Bolivarian process of 
social and political change, it is incumbent upon the international left to 
step back and reflect on the images and realities of Chavismo. An historical 
sociological approach is employed in this article to analyze the big trends 
and contradictions characterizing politics, economics, and class struggle in 
Venezuela over the last ten years. Recent processes are considered against 
the backdrop of the country’s earlier social formation, taking the long view 
of historical and material developments in Venezuelan political economy 
over the last half century from which the Bolivarian process emerged. The 
article emphasizes a theoretical approach that understands the transition 
                                                 
1
 This article is based in part on fieldwork carried out in Venezuela in August and September 
2008. Chavista government officials and rank-and-file activists were interviewed in Mérida and 
Caracas, and the author toured two Nuclei of Endogenous Sustainable Development (Nudes) 
and various radicalized barrios in Caracas, as well as popular community radio stations, and 
several health and education missions set up by the Chávez government. I presented an early 
draft of the paper at the International Institute for Research and Education (IIRE) in 
Amsterdam, as part of the Returns of Marxism Lecture Series. Thanks to everyone who 
attended the talk for the fruitful discussion and debate, especially Antonio Carmona Báez, 
Peter Thomas, and Sara Farris. David Camfield also provided useful feedback on an earlier 
draft. Many thanks also to Elaine Coburn for her comments, editing, and suggestions on earlier 
drafts. 
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to socialism as: the overturning of still-existing capitalist class rule and the 
capitalist state in Venezuela through the self-activity and struggle of the 
popular classes themselves; movement toward democratic social 
coordination of the economy; communal ownership of economic and 
natural resources; worker and community control of workplaces and 
neighbourhoods; the deep expansion of radical democratic rule through all 
political, social, economic, and private spheres of life; and an 
internationalist socialist orientation which privileges solidarity with 
emancipatory movements of the oppressed and exploited around the 
globe. This is quite distinct from versions of socialist theory that privilege 
merely state ownership of the means of production and state allocation of 
resources.  
 Six overarching, interrelated theses are advanced. First, popular 
struggles in Venezuela over the last decade have rejuvenated the 
international critique of neoliberalism and brought socialism back on the 
left’s agenda, although no socialist revolution has been achieved in 
Venezuela. Chavismo is riddled by profound and abiding contradictions, 
thus far preventing a revolutionary overturning of capitalist class rule and 
the capitalist state.  
 Second, Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998 because his 
anti-neoliberal, left-populist platform filled the void created by the collapse 
of the traditional political system and the absence of a revolutionary 
socialist alternative. Modestly reformist at the onset of its first term, the 
Chávez government was slowly and partially radicalized when faced with a 
series of imperialist and domestic, legal and (mainly) extra-legal, right-
wing destabilization campaigns.  
 Third, the government’s radicalizing tendency is a result, more 
specifically, of counter-revolutionary pressure that spurred a dramatic 
effervescence of grassroots struggles amongst the working class and urban 
poor, a small but important minority of whom are committed socialists, 
beginning in April 2002 and accelerating during and after the oil lockout of 
2002-2003.   
 Fourth, against this grass roots, left-populist, and sometimes 
socialist struggle from below, conservative, bureaucratic layers within 
Chavismo have taken on an important role within the state apparatus and 
have hampered a transition to socialism. 
Fifth, the empirical record regarding poverty reduction and social 
programs in Venezuela suggests both real social progress and serious 
contradictions. Poverty has been reduced at rates similar to other centre-
left governments in the region during the commodities boom (2003-2007). 
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Venezuela’s highly unequal income distribution, moreover, makes clear 
there has been no fundamental shift toward socialism.  
 Sixth, the global economic crisis creates novel opportunities and 
challenges for the Bolivarian process, not least as a consequence of the 
fluctuating international price of oil.  
 In the conclusion, I consider the impact of the global economic crisis 
for the left in Venezuela and Latin America more widely, argue for the 
necessity of sustained advance toward socialist transformation from 
below, and consider the various implications for solidarity activists outside 
of Venezuela.   
 
International Images of Venezuela under Chávez 
Mainstream punditry in North America and Europe associates Venezuela 
with the bad Left in contemporary Latin America. This Left is ‘nationalist, 
strident, and close-minded,’  ‘depends on giving away money,’ and has ‘no 
real domestic agenda.’ For the bad Left, ‘the fact of power is more 
important than its responsible exercise,’ and for its leaders, ‘economic 
performance, democratic values, programmatic achievements, and good 
relations with the United States are not imperatives but bothersome 
constraints that miss the real point’ (Castañeda 2006). George W. Bush’s 
national security strategy documents claimed that Hugo Chávez was a 
‘demagogue awash in oil money’, seeking to ‘undermine democracy’ and 
‘destabilize the region’, Donald Rumsfeld compared Chávez to Adolf Hitler, 
reminding us that Hitler, too, had been elected (Grandin 2006).2 Not much 
has changed since Barack Obama took over the world’s most powerful 
presidency. The White House message continues to be that Chávez runs a 
dangerously authoritarian regime in desperate need of ‘democratization.’3  
 Chávez has been a leading opponent of free trade deals between 
Latin American countries and the United States, instead invoking the 
memory of independence hero Simón Bolívar with his vision of a united 
South America to promote a series of trade deals based on principles of 
solidarity (Chávez 2003; Katz 2008; Kellogg 2007). Chávez is openly 
inspired by the Cuban revolution and has a warm friendship with Fidel 
Castro, while stressing Venezuela’s independent path towards a less state-
                                                 
2
 On US imperialism in Venezuela over the course of the Bush presidency, see Golinger 2006; 
2007. 
3
 For exemplary commentary from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, see Henao 2009 and 
Suggett 2009. 
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centered and more pluralistic twenty-first century socialism. Chávez 
emphasizes the need to forge stronger South-South connections against the 
imperialism of the core capitalist states of the world system. This explicitly 
anti-imperialist stance helps to explain the United States support for 
reactionary forces in Venezuela, even in the relative absence of direct 
threats to American corporate interests.4  
 The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), first imagined 
by the Venezuelan government in 2001 as a counter to the North 
American-led Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), is the most 
important expression of Venezuelan-led regional integration. Formally 
established in 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba, it expanded to include Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Ecuador, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda, with Paraguay scheduled to join 
later in 2009 (Hart-Landsberg 2009).  Moreover, soon after Evo Morales 
election in Bolivia in December 2005, Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia signed 
what they called a Peoples’ Trade Agreement. 
 Chávez is revered by many on the Left, since few leaders of the 
Global South today openly and regularly denounce the crimes of American 
imperialism from a left-wing perspective.5 Along with its record of poverty 
reduction and anti-neoliberalism, pursued with popular support in the face 
of domestic right-wing and imperialist assaults, Venezuela helps to revive 
the idea of socialism as a viable political choice. This is an important 
development following the Soviet bloc’s collapse and the discrediting of 
socialism in the wake of Stalinist policies, and explains why Venezuela has 
inspired so much attention and debate.  
 From the right, Chávez has sometimes been crudely lumped in with 
recent ‘neopopulist’ Presidents elsewhere in the region, such as Alberto 
Fujimori in Peru, and Carlos Menem in Argentina (Weyland 2001). 
Chávez’s neopopulism, on this view, includes a feverishly authoritarian 
bent, where ‘political competition’ means ‘[o]pponents must be crushed’, 
and where Chávez employs ‘hate speech’ that sounds ‘more dictatorial than 
democratic’ (Corrales 2009, 81). More serious discussion is occurring on 
the left. There are those who think Chávez is a moderate social democrat 
                                                 
4
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this point. 
5
 Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is an example of a reactionary government opposed to US 
power. Chávez’s unconditional support for Ahmadinejad’s regime as it ferociously repressed 
mass demonstrations in the streets of Tehran and elsewhere in June and July 2009 was a 
travesty that revealed the deeply flawed understandings of socialist internationalism within 
his government. 
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and celebrate this stance as a reasonable and realistic response to the 
current hostile context of neoliberalism and imperialism (Ali 2006). Some 
social democrats, however, celebrate the perceived social gains of the 
Bolivarian process, but fear a ‘regressive evolution’ in the ‘sphere of 
politics’ in which they perceive a ‘closing of the space for participation and 
democratic decision-making’ (López Maya 2007, 175).  Other leftists, while 
remaining critical of different components of the government’s approach, 
contend that Chávez represents something more radical than social 
democracy, something even potentially revolutionary and transformative. 
They tend to stress the social and economic achievements of the regime 
thus far in the face of daunting odds (Wilpert 2007; Lebowitz 2006; Ellner 
2008; Robinson 2007). There are those, finally, who orient themselves 
toward struggling within and for the socialist advance of the Bolivarian 
process, but who emphasize the contradictions, obstacles, delays, setbacks, 
and bureaucratization that have thus far stood in the way of genuine 
socialist transition from below; these obstacles, for the latter set of 
thinkers, represent the clear and present danger to the possibilities for 
emancipation of the popular classes from the exploitation of capital and the 
oppression of imperialism.6 This paper situates itself most closely within 
the last of these sets of leftist commentaries on the Venezuelan scenario. 
 
Historical Backdrop – From puntofijismo to neoliberalismo, 1958-1998 
Between 1945 and 1948 (the trienio) a populist-reformist government was 
led by the Acción Democratica (Democratic Action, AD) – Venezuela’s social 
democratic party. The period’s economic elite, threatened by the potential 
deepening of the AD government’s modest social reforms, formed the 
conservative, Christian democratic, Comité de Organización Política 
Electoral Independiente, (Committee of Independent Electoral Political 
Organization, COPEI), and backed a military overthrow of the 
democratically-elected AD administration. The signing of the Pact of Punto 
Fijo a decade later was the culmination of a compromised democratic 
transition out of the authoritarianism following the 1948 coup. The AD 
moderated its social reformist inclinations and COPEI its overtly 
authoritarian predilections, agreeing to a range of social, economic, and 
political pacts that shaped the new democratic order.  
 The series of compromises encompassed in Punto Fijo included 
power-sharing between the signatory parties – the AD, COPEI, and a 
                                                 
6
 See, especially, the Venezuelan magazine Marea Socialista. 
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smallish left-wing party, Unión Republicana Democrática (Democratic 
Republican Union, URD) – and the exclusion of the Partido Comunista de 
Venezuela (Communist Party of Venezuela, PCV) from the legal political 
system. As the AD and COPEI converged ideologically, and the URD faded, 
oil money ‘made it possible to induce business, labor, church, and military 
cooperation with the democratic regime’ (Roberts 2003, 57). Venezuelan 
democracy ‘rested upon a material basis: the distribution of international 
oil rents through a system of clientelism’. The oil boom of the 1970s, ‘and 
nationalization of the foreign oil companies in 1976 were the culmination 
of this project associating democracy, oil nationalism, and development’ 
(Hellinger 2003, 27). This nationalization had important consequences, 
creating a form of national rentier capitalism and attendant fractions of the 
domestic bourgeoisie whose benefits and interests were tied to its 
continuation. Protection of these interests helps to explain the origins and 
intensity of the oil lockout in late 2002 and early 2003. 
 Between 1970 and 1980 oil prices increased 948 percent (Weisbrot 
and Sandoval 2007, 5), creating tremendous wealth, most of it captured by 
the state through oil rents. Capital’s continued allegiance to the regime was 
secured through extremely low domestic tax rates and abundant access to 
cheap public credit. Meanwhile, a meagre but important part of the rent 
trickled down to the popular classes, particularly during the first 
administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979). Workers were paid 
higher wages than in the rest of Latin America and there were price 
controls and subsidies on basic food goods, transportation, and social 
services like education and health care (Roberts 2003, 57). Nostalgia for 
the golden years of the 1970s permeated Venezuelan political and social 
life for the subsequent two decades as the economy endured a dramatic 
reversal.  
 Contrary to many claims, Venezuela’s political economy between 
the 1960s and early 1980s was not exceptional but typical of Latin 
America. The region’s economy grew by 82 percent between 1960 and 
1980, the same time that Venezuela experienced its boom. Likewise, when 
oil prices crashed and Latin America entered the debt crisis of the 1980s – 
growing only 15 percent in the 26 years between 1980 and 2006 – 
Venezuela also plunged into the abyss – although Venezuela’s fall proved 
longer and deeper than most. Real GDP plummeted by 26 percent between 
1978 and 1986, hitting the floor in 2003 at 38 percent below its 1978 high 
(Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007, 4). The neoliberal economic restructuring 
initiated in 1989, during Pérez’s second administration and consolidated in 
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the mid-to late 1990s under Rafael Caldera, made the crisis particularly 
intense.  
 In some other South American nations neoliberals were re-elected 
in the 1990s – Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Menem in Argentina, for 
example. Yet, Venezuelans consistently voted for anti-neoliberal 
candidates. Pérez, elected in 1989, was identified with the state 
interventionist policies of his first government. Caldera (1994-1999) ran 
on an explicitly anti-neoliberal platform, unlike his rivals. Likewise, Hugo 
Chávez was the only anti-neoliberal presidential candidate (Ellner 2008, 
89). Pérez and Caldera later revealed themselves devotees of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) orthodoxy but both were elected on anti-neoliberal 
platforms. 
 In the 1990s there was a rash of privatizations – including the state 
telephone company, CANTV, the state steel industry, SIDOR, and the social 
security system. Trade, prices, and the financial sector were liberalized. 
The labour market was made ‘flexible,’ and other polices conforming to the 
so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ were introduced (Gott  2005, 54). 
Richard Gott writes: ‘In earlier and happier times, when claiming 
leadership of the Third World in the 1970s, Pérez had denounced the 
economists of the IMF as “genocide workers in the pay of economic 
totalitarianism.” Now he was having to go on all fours to beg for money 
from an institution he had once described as “an economic neutron bomb” 
that “killed people but left buildings standing”’ (Gott 2005, 54). 
 The social repercussions were severe. Per capita income by 1998 
had declined 34.8 percent from its 1970 level, the worst collapse in the 
region. Likewise, by 1997, workers’ share of the national income was half 
what it had been in 1970, and the country’s gini coefficient measure of 
income inequality was worse than in the notoriously unequal Brazil and 
South Africa (Lander and Navarrete 2007,9). Cuts to wages and social 
spending in 1989 precipitated an increase in poverty from 46 to 62 percent 
(Roberts 2003, 59).  
 Parallel to trends in inequality and poverty, the rural and urban 
class underwent profound transformations in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Employment moved away from agricultural and industrial towards the 
service sector, and from the formal to informal sector. Precariously 
constructed shantytowns in major urban centres – particularly Caracas – 
expanded massively.7 ‘Throughout the 1980s’, notes historian Greg 
                                                 
7
 This process was not unique to Venezuela. Mike Davis (2006) charts trends of accelerated 
proletarianization of the peasantry throughout the Third World in the neoliberal age, as well 
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Grandin, ‘Caracas grew at a galloping pace, creating combustible 
concentrations of poor people cut off from municipal services – such as 
sanitation and safe drinking water – and hence party control’ (Grandin 
2006). The under-and unemployed workers who populated these 
Venezuelan slums made 30 percent lower wages in the informal sector 
compared to the formal sector (Roberts 2003, 60). By the end of the 1990s, 
the informal economy employed 53 percent of the workforce (Ellner 2003, 
19). 
 
The Caracazo and Popular Resistance 
Venezuela’s neoliberalization was contested. Pérez’s restructuring plan of 
1989, including the end of domestic gasoline subsidies, led to a hike in fuel 
costs. Drivers of the most common form of working-class transit in urban 
centres, known as por puestos, attempted to transfer costs to passengers by 
illegally doubling fares, a measure that ignited mass protests and riots, 
known as the caracazo, between February 27 and March 5, 1989. Tens of 
thousands of the urban poor participated. The army and police violently 
repressed the protests, leaving an official count of 287 dead, and unofficial 
counts of between 1,000 and 1,500 killed, according to national medial 
personnel. The highest, widely-circulated figure is 3,000 dead (Wilpert 
2007, 16; Hellinger 2003, 31). Today, the caracazo is deeply ingrained in 
the popular memory of the Venezuelan Left, marking the start of the 
Bolivarian ‘revolutionary process’.8 The rebellion and repression had an 
impact on some officers in the Venezuelan armed forces who ‘had not 
assimilated to North American geopolitical doctrines nor been fully 
integrated into the structures of puntofijismo.’ Among these was Hugo 
Chávez, part of the ‘first cohort of officers to have attended civilian 
universities and not to have undergone training at US counterinsurgency 
schools’ (Hellinger 2003, 41). 
 
Chávez Fills a Void 
In the early 1980s, when Chávez was a sports instructor at the military 
academy in Caracas, he and other likeminded military critics of the 
                                                                                                                                  
as the rise of an “informal proletariat” and the proliferation of shantytowns in his book, Planet 
of Slums. 
8
 Personal interview, Oscar González, coordinator of the Organization of Social Movements for 
Popular Power, in the Mérida branch of the new Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV), 5 September 2008, Mérida, Venezuela. 
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Venezuelan social and political system formed the Ejército Bolivariano 
Revolucionario-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Army, EBR-200), the ‘200’ 
representing the anniversary of independence hero Simón Bolívar’s birth 
in 1783 (Wilpert 2007, 16). Following the caracazo, the EBR-200 increased 
contacts with civilian political groups, and changed its name to the 
Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200, (Bolivarian Revolutionary 
Movement, MBR-200) (Raby 2006,149). Civilians included Douglas Bravo, 
a guerrilla leader in Falcón in the 1960s, who collaborated with Chavez in 
the 1980s ‘but withdrew after 1992, convinced that civilians were being 
by-passed and that Chávez’s programme was insufficiently radical’ (Gott 
2005, 17-18). 
 Between 1989 and 1992, Chávez and his co-conspirators planned a 
military uprising against the Pérez government, launching the rebellion on 
4 February 1992. It achieved some early military objectives, but most 
military insurgents were quickly captured and surrendered.9 No civilian 
uprising accompanied the coup attempt. Chávez’s conspiratorial effort to 
challenge neoliberalism through the militant actions of a small group, 
rather than through the mass mobilization and self-emancipation of the 
exploited and oppressed themselves, was an inevitable failure.10 But in the 
wake of the state murders during the caracazo, the attempted coup’s bold 
challenge to the regime was well-received by the popular classes. Chávez 
was sent to prison for two years and was amnestied in 1994. In November, 
1992 a second failed coup occurred, but without the progressive veneer of 
the February attempt. ‘It was clear that a further uprising would have 
neither military feasibility nor popular support,’ notes historian D.L. Raby, 
‘the strategy now had to be political’ (Raby 2006, 156). 
 
The Chávez Alternative in Lieu of a Revolutionary Left 
The popular narrative of the Venezuelan Left today describes a steadily 
building wave of popular rebellions from the caracazo of 1989 to the two 
coup attempts of 1992. Yet, the spontaneous and relatively disorganized 
                                                 
9
 For one account, see Gott 2005, 63-70. 
10
 As Rosa Luxemburg argued in the course of the revolutionary events in Germany in 1918 
and 1919, ‘The socialist revolution is the first which is in the interests of the great majority and 
can be brought to victory only by the great majority of the working people themselves.” And 
elsewhere: “Socialism will not and cannot be created by decrees; nor can it be created by any 
government, however socialistic. Socialism must be created by the masses, by every 
proletarian. Where the chains of capitalism are forged, there they must be broken. Only that is 
socialism, and only thus can socialism be created’ (quoted in McNally 2006, 348). 
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character of the caracazo, and the elitist military strategy of the 1992 
events, actually signalled the weakness of the Venezuelan revolutionary 
Left during this period, and the relatively thin basis for organized, wide-
scale, radical popular movements from below, compared to those that 
swept Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, for example.11  On an aggregate 
scale there were, by some accounts, roughly 5,000 protests in the first 
three years of neoliberal reforms (1989-1991), but these were mainly 
restricted to community-based, localized, and defensive strategies of the 
urban poor (Roberts 2003, 61). Likewise, the visible spread of 
neighbourhood council movements, some feminist organizing, social 
justice groups, environmental activism, and human rights organizations 
later in the 1990s did not represent an offensive and organized challenge 
to capital but rather isolated defensive, local struggles. 
 The labour movement was also relatively quiescent, suffering 
structurally from the flexibilization and informalization of work and the 
dramatic changes to class structure wrought by neoliberal reforms. 
Politically, the labour movement was still overwhelmingly controlled by 
the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), whose leadership quickly 
capitulated to the neoliberal regime. 
 La Causa Radical (The Radical Cause, LCR), with origins in the 
fledgling independent union movement of the late 1980s, appeared to 
represent an electoral alternative for the Left in the early 1990s. For 
example, the party’s presidential candidate, Andrés Velásquez, won a 
surprising 22 percent in the 1993 elections (Ellner 1999). The party 
initially defended, ‘grass-roots democracy and bottom-up organising based 
on the autonomy of working-class and popular communities.’ However, 
beginning in 1994 the party ‘allowed itself to be drawn into parliamentary 
horse-trading’ with traditional, mainstream political parties, abandoning 
grass roots organizing and losing its main constituency (Raby 2006, 140, 
144). By 1997, the party had split, with the larger contingent forming the 
Patria Para Todos (Fatherland for Everyone, PPT) (Gott 2005, 132). The 
splintering of the LCR, and the absence of any other serious Left 
alternative, provided political space for Chávez’s Movimiento Quinta 
República (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR), the party that those in and 
around the MBR-200 had created to participate in the 1998 presidential 
elections. 
                                                 
11
 On Bolivia, see, in particular, Hylton and Thomson 2007; Webber,2010; Gutiérrez Aguilar 
2008.  
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 Thus, we have a complex conjuncture at the close of the 1990s that 
is ultimately conducive to Chávez’s electoral victory: 
Twenty years of economic stagnation without an apparent solution in sight, 
structural adjustment policies which aggravated an already grossly unequal 
income distribution; the undermining of the ‘modern’ social structure built on 
the basis of the previous development model; the growth of the informal 
economy and the lack, for the majority of the population, of any prospect of 
social advancement or even social inclusion; all these factors contributed to a 
popular rebellion in February 1989, known as the Caracazo, which indicated a 
radical repudiation of the old socio-political order and marked the beginning of 
a search for alternatives (López Maya  2007, 161-162). 
In this context, Chávez won 56 percent of the popular vote in the December 
1998 elections, taking office as President in 1999. The urban poor had 
responded to Chávez’s ‘vitriolic attacks on the political establishment’, just 
as ‘the middle and upper classes recoiled before the uncertain scope and 
depth of impending changes’ (Roberts 2003, 55).  
 Class polarization was highly racialized, challenging the long-
standing nationalist myth of Venezuelan racial democracy. According to 
national census figures, 67 percent of Venezuelans are mestizos, or mixed 
race, ten percent are black, 21 percent are white, and two percent are 
indigenous. ‘The esteem in which Chávez is held by the dark-skinned poor,’ 
Grandin suggests, ‘is amplified by the rage the Venezuelan president 
provokes among the white and the rich’ (Grandin 2006). Chávez’s self-
identification as ‘Indian’, ‘black’, or ‘mixed-breed’, infuses these terms with 
a novel sense of pride. When Chávez is critiqued by the Right as, ‘Indian, 
monkey, and thick-lipped’, this racial contempt serves to ally Chávez with 
the majority of the population that similarly identifies as ‘mixed breed,’ 
‘Black,’ or ‘Indian’ (Herrera Salas, 2005). Class and racial identification thus 
combine in a form or populist support for Chávez. 
 
Anti-Neoliberalism to Twenty-First Century Socialism? Trajectory of Chávez 
The New Constitution and Neoliberalism with a Human Face, 1999-2000 
Chávez’s 1998 electoral campaign and first two years in office were 
characterized by moderate socio-economic proposals that failed to break 
with the basic neoliberal model.12 Chávez did take a bold initiative in 
restoring power to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
                                                 
12
 The periodization, if not always the characterization, of the different stages of the Chávez 
government in this section corresponds closely to Ellner 2008 and Lander and Navarrete 2007.  
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(OPEC), with lasting effects on state revenues. During the administration’s 
first months, Alí Rodríguez Araque, the Minister of Oil and Mines, was sent 
on a series of diplomatic trips to member countries of the cartel, as well as 
to non-OPEC oil-producing states such as Mexico. An agreement to cut 
production was reached, and by the end of 1999 the price of oil had 
increased to $US 25 per barrel from the historic low of $US 9 per barrel in 
February of that year (Raby 2006, 161). The revived OPEC quotas for 
production, in conjunction with the Iraq war, led to the steady rise of oil 
prices from that period until the recent global financial crisis. 
 Politically, the new government was more ambitious, convening a 
Constituent Assembly and a relatively participatory process of drawing up 
a new Constitution. The 1999 constitution, approved by a popular 
referendum, emphasizes that Venezuelan democracy is participatory and 
protagonistic, not merely representative, and states that human relations 
should be rooted in ‘equality of rights and duties, solidarity, common 
effort, mutual understanding, and reciprocal respect.’ It views as necessary 
‘the participation of the people in forming, carrying out and controlling the 
management of public affairs.’ This participation will ‘ensure their 
complete development, both individual and collective’ (quoted in Lebowitz 
2006, 89).  
 The Constitution bans the privatization of the state-owned oil 
company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and includes language 
favourable to various economic, personal, cultural, and environmental 
rights and protections. The state pledges that workers will have sufficient 
salaries to live dignified lives and explicitly recognizes unpaid work within 
the home – principally conducted by women – as an economic activity, 
which, in theory if not yet fully in practice, makes it eligible for social 
security (Grandin 2006). Additionally, the Bolivarian Constitution 
recognizes various indigenous rights and forbids foreign troops on 
Venezuelan soil. At the same time, the constitution does not protect 
women’s right to abortion, nor does it include anti-discrimination on the 
basis of sexual diversity, although Chávez himself has pledged support for 
such rights (Webber 2004). 
 Yet the limitations are most starkly revealed in the economics 
sphere. The nation’s twenty-seventh Constitution remains distant from 
anti-capitalism, guaranteeing the right of property (Article 115), 
supporting the role of private initiative in fostering economic growth and 
employment (Article 299), and promising state support for private 
initiatives (Article 112). The Constitution entrenches balanced budgets 
(over several years), and provides for the Venezuelan Central Bank’s 
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autonomy in monetary policy (Articles 311 and 318) (Lebowitz 2006, 90), 
an approach that assumes that bankers, not elected governments, should 
make critical economic decisions (Lebowitz 2008). 
 The early Chávez government’s limited vision in the socio-economic 
sphere was evident in its first long-term development plan, published in 
2001 as a guide for state policy through to 2007 (MPD 2001). The 
document presupposed that the best way to transform the Venezuelan 
economy was to attract ‘private capital, both domestic and foreign’ through 
state interventions promoting financial stability, the creation of free trade 
zones, stable exchange rates, and a stock market to ‘create a growing 
democratisation of management capitalism,’ among other measures 
designed to reassure foreign investors (Lander and Naverrete 2007, 15).  
 The development plan reflected the neo-structural influence of the 
United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC, or CEPAL in its Spanish acronym.) Neo-structuralism is the Latin 
American equivalent of neo-Keynesianism in the advanced capitalist 
countries, a ‘third way’ road adapting social democracy to the fundamental 
macroeconomic constraints of neoliberalism (Leiva, 2008). At this stage of 
the Chávez presidency, Venezuela adhered to wider politico-economic 
developments across Latin America in the wake of the deep regional 
downturn (1999-2000) and the overwhelming de-legitimization of 
orthodox neoliberalism. But no real break with neoliberalism had 
occurred: ‘Without relinquishing its essential emphasis on the rationality 
of the market as the foremost organizing principal of social life, 
contemporary neoliberalism has dramatically broadened the scope of its 
social engineering in order to address its internal contradictions and 
attempt to mediate the ensuing social conflicts that have sharpened over 
the last 3 decades’ (Taylor 2009, 23). Thus, targeted anti-poverty programs 
aimed at the most destitute have been introduced, without challenging 
neoliberalism’s fundamental ideological premises. 
 A number of commentaries from the international Left, published in 
journals like Green Left Weekly, Venezuela Analysis, Monthly Review, and 
Links, have made bold retroactive assertions about the radicalizing nature 
of the Chávez regime as early as 1999 and 2000. But such analyses have 
been rooted in hopes and aspirations of the past few years rather than 
being based on actual developments of the period in question. Indeed, 
‘Shortly after taking office in 1999, the Venezuelan president traveled to 
Wall Street to assure the moneymen of the “credibility” of his government 
and its aims of a “diversified” and “self-sufficient economy,” as well as 
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throwing the first pitch at a New York Yankees baseball game and ringing 
the bell at the New York Stock Exchange’ (Sustar 2007, 19). 
Counter-Revolution and the Awakening of Popular Power from Below, 2001-
2004 
Nonetheless, the government’s economic policy slowly changed beginning 
in 2001, with a new package of 49 laws, among them, the Organic 
Hydrocarbons Law, the Lands Law, and the Fisheries Law. The 
hydrocarbons law re-established majority government ownership in the 
public-private companies in the principal oil operations of the country. The 
Lands Law opened idle land up to potential expropriation by the state. The 
Fisheries Law expanded the area off the shoreline from which major 
commercial trawlers were forbidden, and explicitly favoured small-scale 
fishers (Ellner 2008, 113).  
 All three were seen by Venezuela’s right-wing opposition – 
composed of various political parties, the CTV, the business federation 
(FEDECAMARAS), the overwhelming majority of private print and TV 
media, right-wing student groups, and the Catholic Church hierarchy, 
among other minority social forces – as potentially threatening 
fundamental private property rights. Led by FEDECAMARAS and CTV, the 
opposition initiated a concerted destabilization campaign with a two-
month general strike that began in December 2001, followed shortly 
thereafter by the April 2002 coup, in which Chávez was temporarily ousted 
and FEDECAMARAS president Pedro Carmona declared the country’s new 
leader.  
 All of this transpired with imperial backing (Golinger 2008, 13). 
Indeed, the United States government supported the coup, seeing Chávez 
as a threat for his outspoken comments on American imperial 
interventions in Afghanistan and the broader ‘war on terror,’ Chávez’s 
support for a multi-polar world order, and his efforts to foment anti-
imperialist consciousness and Latin American independence and solidarity 
across the region as against the unilateral project of US imperial might. As 
mentioned above, Chávez did not directly threaten US material interests, 
but the ideological and political threat of anti-imperialism was sufficient to 
warrant American support for reactionary forces, including destabilizing, 
right-wing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating within 
Venezuela. 
  Yet, as Leon Trotsky’s observes, ‘a revolution needs from time to 
time the whip of the counter-revolution’ which can provide ‘a powerful 
impetus to the radicalization of the masses’ (Trotsky 2005 [1932], 774). 
When word broke of the coup, ‘hundreds of thousands of poor Venezuelans 
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poured down from the “ranchos” [shantytowns]’, and ‘surrounded the 
Presidential Palace, leading to division in the armed forces.’ A minority of 
right-wing military officers favoured ‘a massive bloodbath,’ whereas a 
majority rejected such measures, either out of loyalty to Chavez’s left-
populist programme or out of fear of a class-based civil war (Petras 2007). 
 The April 2002 mobilizations were of a scale and importance not 
witnessed since the Caracazo. They marked a turning point in which class 
struggle from below – albeit with a stronger populist than socialist flavour 
– erupted with new force as a response to right-wing counter-revolution 
(Robinson 2007). Rather than pushing ahead from this newly mobilized 
basis of support, however, Chávez moderated his rhetorical flourishes and 
offered concessions to the opposition in the wake of the coup: the 
Presidential Commission for a National Dialogue was established, bringing 
together coupist oppositional forces and the government; more radical 
officials in the Chávez government were replaced with known moderates; 
decentralization provisions of the 1999 Constitution that favoured right-
wing possibilities in state governorships were brought forward on the 
agenda, and oil company executives at PDVSA fired prior to the coup were 
rehired by the President (Ellner 2008, 118). 
 The opposition proved uninterested in the government’s goodwill 
gestures. The Right clung to the hope of throwing Chávez out altogether. 
‘Following a brief period of uncertain calm,’ Gregory Wilpert points out, 
‘the opposition interpreted Chávez’s retreat as an opportunity for another 
offensive against him, this time by organizing an indefinite shutdown of the 
country’s all important oil industry in early December 2002’ (Wilpert 
2007, 25). Rather than a ‘general strike,’ as the opposition labelled the 
actions, ‘it was actually a combination of management lockout, 
administrative and professional employee strike, and general sabotage of 
the oil industry.’ The business lockout was in part supported by the 
bourgeois fractions that had been created and sustained by national 
rentier capitalism following the 1970s nationalization of the oil industry. In 
solidarity with the rentier element, ‘[i]t was mostly the US fast food 
franchises and the upscale shopping malls that were closed for about two 
months. The rest of the country operated more or less normally during this 
time, except for food and gasoline shortages throughout Venezuela, mostly 
because many distribution centers were closed down’ (Wilpert 2007, 25).  
 In the short term, the oil lockout cost the Venezuelan economy $US 
6 billion (Grandin 2006). In the longer term it generated new revenue for 
the Venezuelan government, because once the lockout had been defeated, 
real state control of the oil industry was finally wrested from the hands of 
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the old PDVSA elite: ‘Due to their subversive and saboteur attitude, around 
18,000 upper and middle-level managers who opposed the government – 
and who actually exercised control of the company – created the conditions 
in which they could be legally dismissed’ (Harnecker, 2007, 181). 
 The defeat of the 2002-2003 oil lockout had a major impact on the 
labour movement. Within the oil industry, skilled and unskilled workers 
restarted production with the assistance of technical personnel and from 
surrounding communities, ‘at a time when most high-ranking PDVSA 
employees had walked off the job’. During the strike the ‘workers 
collectively chose their supervisors and took charge of the basic 
operational facet of the industry,’ setting ‘an important precedent’ (Ellner 
2008, 162, 187). The period of workers’ control and self-management did 
not last long, but its significance is difficult to exaggerate (Sustar 2007, 20). 
Immediately following this example of workers’ power, capacities, and 
commitment, a section of the labour movement pressured PDVSA for 
greater workers’ control in the industry. However, ‘PDVSA heads adhered 
to a view… that the oil industry should avoid the types of worker 
participation being established in other state-controlled sectors due to its 
overwhelming importance to the nation’s economy’ (Ellner 2008, 162). In 
this they were ultimately backed by the government – one example of 
unevenness and contradiction in Chavez’s commitments to socialism.  
 Also in this 2002-2003 period of heightened class struggle, workers’ 
occupied a number of large- and medium sized enterprises claiming that 
the owners had locked them out without pay or severance benefits. 
Encapsulating the contradictions of Chavismo, ‘The government refused to 
dislodge the workers but also refrained from turning the companies over 
to worker management and instead deferred to the courts’ (Ellner 2008, 
124). Finally, at the end of these heated months, militant workers formed 
the National Union of Venezuelan Workers (UNT) as an alternative labour 
confederation to the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV). The CTV 
had collaborated with the state under the Punto Fijo system, capitulated to 
neoliberalism in the late 1980s and 1990s, and participated directly in the 
April 2002 coup attempt, and 2002-2003 oil lockout. The UNT’s formation 
in May 2003 became a pivotal space for debate around ‘issues of worker 
control, their workplaces and the role of unions’ (Gindin 2005).  
 Having failed to depose Chávez through extra-parliamentary 
channels in 2002 and 2003, the Right exploited a new democratic opening 
established in the 1999 Bolivarian constitution: the right to force a recall 
referendum to determine whether or not the President finishes his or her 
term in office if 20 percent of the population, or 2.4 million people, express 
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their desire to do so through a petition. By November 2003, the opposition 
had collected 3 million signatures, but the National Electoral Council (CNE) 
determined that only 1.9 million were valid, leaving the opposition less 
than a week to meet the deadline for required signatures. The government 
established a group of loyal militants under the title ‘Comando Ayacucho’ 
to mobilize their base and raise consciousness, in order to prevent the 
opposition from gathering the necessary remaining signatures. Despite 
constant reassurances to the contrary, however, the Comando Ayacucho 
failed and a recall referendum was set for August 2004. 
 The struggle within Venezuelan society in the months leading up to 
the referendum revealed new strengths in autonomous working-class 
organization and initiative, this time in the popular barrios, or poor 
neighbourhoods, of the capital city. There is undoubtedly a level of 
mutually-reinforcing synergy between the popular movements in the 
barrios and the figure of Chávez. Nonetheless, the former have ‘realized the 
need to chart an independent trajectory from the Chávez government, of 
“oficialismo”… to defend the interests of their community and sustain their 
projects’.  Indeed, community activists felt ‘shocked and betrayed by the 
Comando Ayacucho,’ when they heard the news that a recall referendum 
would be held. They strategically cooperated with vertically-oriented 
structures but insisted on the role of autonomous community 
organizations in mobilizing to defeat the referendum, as this passage 
describes: 
In a series of local assemblies in La Vega, 23 de Enero, and other barrios, 
community leaders emphasized the need for self-organization, saying that 
barrio residents could not rely on the government and officially appointed 
committees to organize ‘on their behalf.’…. In the lead up to the referendum, 
local networks and activists were key in organizing popular sectors in support 
of the ‘No’ campaign to keep Chávez in office. Chávez replaced the Comando 
Ayacucho with the Comando Maisanta, and a vertically-organized structure of 
local units known as Unidades de Batallas Electorales (UBEs). Community 
groups cooperated with the UBEs and at times even incorporated into them, 
but for the most part these were tactical and temporary groupings to win the 
referendum. The driving force behind the ‘No’ campaign came from organized 
community activists, who launched an aggressive campaign to register and 
mobilize voters to vote in the referendum. Community organizers set up Voter 
Registration Centers in all the parishes, and these were staffed around the 
clock by teams of local activists. Barrio-based radio and television stations and 
newspapers devoted space to explaining the importance of the referendum 
and encouraging people to vote for Chávez…. Rather than Chávez’s charisma, 
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his subsidized social programs, or the ineptitude of the opposition, the decisive 
factor in Chávez’s ultimate victory was the mobilizing role played by local barrio 
organizations (Fernandes 2007a, 18). 
In the event, Chávez defeated the opposition by 58 percent to 42 percent. 
This result, later combined with the opposition’s disastrous boycott of the 
December 2005 congressional elections, strengthened the government’s 
hand and ushered in a new phase of the administration, characterized by 
increasingly radical rhetoric, and a series of anti-neoliberal, if not socialist 
measures.13 
 
Where’s the Revolutionary Democracy? The Grassroots and the PSUV 
In early 2005 Chávez first declared his commitment to twenty-first century 
socialism at the World Social Forum in Brazil. What is meant by that phrase 
has taken on somewhat more developed programmatic content since, but 
in 2005 it was especially vague: a new socialism, as distinct from the failed 
projects of the same name in the twentieth century. It would be more 
decentralized, more democratic, less state-centered and committed to 
‘establishing liberty, equality, social justice, and solidarity.’ While a bold 
move to reclaim the term socialism, its opacity made it ‘indistinguishable 
from most other social projects of the twentieth and twenty-first century,’ 
that promised the same things (Wilpert 2007, 7). 
 What is clear is that over the course of 2005 and 2006 the special 
mission programs in health and education established in 2003 – erected 
parallel to the existing structures of the old state apparatus in these fields – 
were widened and deepened. Co-management, allowing for workers’ 
representation on state company boards was extended beyond certain 
aspects of the corporatist structures seen in European social democracies 
in a limited number of companies. In the state aluminum company, 
ALCASA, for example, there was labour and community participation in the 
drawing up of the 2006 budget. Likewise, in early 2005 the state 
expropriated the paper company VENEPAL, changing its name to the 
Venezuelan Endogenous Paper Industry, or INVEPAL. Valve and tube 
companies were also expropriated. By the end of 2005, INVEPAL was a 
                                                 
13
 Here I concur with Susan Spronk: “While Chávez—arguably the one of the most radical 
leaders of the ‘Pink Tide’—speaks passionately about alternatives to capitalism, his actions in 
the first ten years of the Bolivarian Revolution have indicated that the primary goal of his 
‘twenty-first century socialism’ has been the construction of a capitalist welfare state with 
pockets of cooperativism on the margins of the economy.”  See Spronk (forthcoming).  
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worker-run cooperative.14 Land reform also advanced in 2005, with the 
government dividing up some large estates owned by domestic and foreign 
agro-capitalists. These were distributed to landless peasants.  
 The existing tax system, long ignored by many businesses, was 
enforced, generating new revenue for the state outside of oil rents. In 
urban land reform, the state devolved some power to urban land 
committees (CTUs) first been established in 2002. By mid-2005, over six 
thousand CTUs, made up of residents in poor urban neighbourhoods, were 
in operation. They were authorized to survey their shantytowns, distribute 
land titles, and collectively generate ideas and designs for public and 
recreational spaces in their communities.15 
  In 2005 and 2006, the government extended the ‘social economy,’ 
including, ‘redistribution of wealth (via land reform programs and social 
policies), promotion of cooperatives, creation of nuclei of endogenous 
development, industrial co-management, and social production 
enterprises’ (Wilpert 2007, 77). By some accounts, the number of 
cooperatives expanded from 762 in 1998 to more than 100,000 by 2005 
(Wilpert 2007, 77). Many of these registered cooperatives however, never 
actually got up and running, and were a major area of corruption and 
government revenue loss.16 
 In the December 2006 elections, Chávez was re-elected to another 
six-year term with 63 percent of the popular vote. With a new mandate and 
the opposition at its weakest level in years, the President signalled a 
radicalization of the Bolivarian Process with the announcement of the ‘five 
motors’ of twenty-first century socialism in January 2007. These included: 
an ‘enabling law’ giving the executive new legislative power for a set 
period of time so as to speed up the transition to socialism; a reform of the 
1999 Bolivarian Constitution to amend sections to help establish twenty-
                                                 
14
 Kiraz Janicke explains how ‘Venezuela's recovered factories, despite having the support of 
the Chavez government, are in essence faced with the same problem of the recovered 
factories in Argentina: how to survive in a sea of capitalist economic relations, how to ensure 
supply of raw materials, how to ensure a buyer for the finished product. Inveval is suffering 
from both of these problems’ (Janicke 2007). 
15
 This section draws heavily from Ellner 2008, 121-126. 
16
 This is clear, for example, in the following assessment: ‘The failure of mass numbers of 
state-financed cooperatives – due to improvisation or, worse yet, misuse of government funds 
– has translated into the loss of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. While many 
cooperatives never got off the ground, in other cases cooperative members ended up 
pocketing the money received from loans or the down payments for contracts prior to the 
initiation of work’ (Ellner 2008, 130). 
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first century socialism; a campaign of political and social education and 
consciousness-raising called ‘Morality and Enlightenment,’ to be carried 
out by community councils in communities and workplaces; revisions of 
the country’s political and territorial units to redistribute power more 
equitably on geographic terms throughout the country’s cities, states, and 
countryside; and, fifth, what was deemed ‘the revolutionary explosion of 
communal power’, devolving  economic, social, political, and democratic 
power to the communal councils (Harnecker 2007, 187-188). 
 Chávez called for the creation of a United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela (PSUV) as an umbrella for all parties supporting his government 
– his own MVR, the PPT, Podemos, the PCV, and roughly 20 other micro-
parties. Further, he promised that key sectors of the Venezuelan economy 
would be nationalized, beginning with the telecommunications, energy, 
and oil production sectors. The formerly state-owned telephone company 
CANTV was re-nationalized, as were the regional-based electricity 
companies throughout the country. Most crucially, the government 
announced the nationalization of the only oil fields in the country that 
continued under private control, those of the Orinoco Oil Belt. These 
nationalizations entailed the movement of state control from minority to 
majority shareholding status and billions of dollars in compensation to 
multinational corporations. The nationalizations failed to incorporate the 
essential socialist ingredient of workers’ control, democracy, and self-
management.  Nevertheless, this move signalled a radicalization of 
government policy (Wilpert 2007, 219-223). 
 Most important were the proposed amendments to the 1999 
Bolivarian Constitution. On 2 December 2007 Venezuelans participated in 
another referendum, in which they had the opportunity to ratify or reject 
69 constitutional changes, 33 proposed by Chávez, and 36 drafted by the 
National Assembly. Among the progressive characteristics of the proposed 
reforms were: the reduction of the work week to 36 hours; the elimination 
of the autonomy of the Central Bank; requirement of gender parity in 
positions of public office; recognition of Afro-Venezuelan groups; the 
reduction of the voting age from 18 to 16; recognition and increased 
funding for Councils of Popular Power, including student, peasant, and 
workers’ councils, as well as cooperatives and community enterprises; 
state promotion of new economic model, based in humanism and 
cooperation, and introducing legal recognition of various forms of social, 
communal and state property, as well as state promotion of social forms of 
production and distribution and mixed public-private enterprises 
(Fernandes, 2007b). This conglomeration of amendments still recognized 
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the legality of privately-owned capitalist enterprises but undoubtedly 
represented an advance on the 1999 scenario. 
 When the referendum amendments were defeated by a margin of 
roughly 200,000 votes, with an abstention rate of 45 percent, it 
represented a major political blow to the Chávez government. The process 
of change has been insufficiently democratic and top-down, based 
increasingly on the personification of twenty-first century socialism in 
Chávez, rather than in the revolutionary practice, initiative, and the 
popular power of the exploited and oppressed. These fundamental 
shortcomings in strategy, ideology, and orientation – a consequence of 
both a lack of commitment to revolutionary democracy within the 
dominant currents of the Chávez government and the simultaneous 
absence of a sufficiently powerful socialist rather than populist working-
class base of support – bled into some ill-considered content in the 
proposed amendments. 
 The proposal to extend the presidential term from six to seven 
years, and the elimination of the two-term limit is an example of the 
misguided nature of many reforms. This has confused sections of the 
radical Left. On the one hand, the imperialist and domestic Venezuelan 
Right are hypocritical when they argue that this amendment signaled the 
death of democracy in the country and the advance of totalitarian 
communism. None of these pundits question the democratic character of 
consecutive terms in office for the executive power in multiple European 
and North American states (Petras 2007). And, clearly, Chávez is no 
dictator, immediately accepting the referendum defeat in December 2007 
and congratulating his opponents. 
 On the other hand, the ‘low-level personality cult that exists around 
Chávez is an obstacle to the full implementation of the Bolivarian project’ 
(Wilpert 2007, 200). As a number of revolutionary socialists inside 
Venezuela have suggested in relation to the presidential term extension: 
‘The important thing should not be such a possibility, but changes making 
it possible to advance towards a more democratic regime, which instead of 
continuing to invent new tasks and responsibilities within the executive 
power, legitimates the power of the workers’ and peoples’ organizations, 
envisages that they should have majority representation in a new 
Parliament, extends the possibilities of recall by the voters, in an 
immediate way and for all functions, and defends at all levels of political 
and economic decision the right of the people to express themselves and to 
decide’ (Peres Borges, García, and Vivas, 2008). 
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 ‘At a moment when the context made it possible to go much further, 
to undertake a reform by establishing spaces of dialogue and power all 
over the country’, Fernando Esteban observes, ‘Chávez threw down a 
challenge to the entire Bolivarian and revolutionary movement, forcing it 
to be with him or against him’. The line was: ‘To vote No is to vote for Bush, 
to vote Yes is to vote for Chávez’ (Esteban 2008). While the content of the 
reforms was broadly progressive, and threatening to capital and the 
various right-wing opposition forces, it was developed without 
participation by the popular classes. Indeed, Chávez drafted the proposals 
with the participation of a small, select group of advisers personally chosen 
by him (Fernandes 2007b). 
 Since Chávez’s re-election in December 2006, the founding of the 
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the role of expanding 
communal councils have been the most important political and 
organizational questions for the Venezuelan Left. The PSUV is full of 
internal contradictions, and has developed into the battle ground between 
the Right and Left within the Bolivarian process. On the one hand, there are 
the radical aspirations and impressive organizational capacities of the 
grassroots militants of the party, and the fact that the party quickly grew to 
over 4 million members soon after its founding July 2007 – although 
clearly with different levels of participation among the membership. A 
number of revolutionary socialists became delegates to the party’s 
congress in March 2008, while others have played essential roles in the 
local battalions of the party on an ongoing basis. Activists formerly 
involved in different revolutionary parties have committed themselves to 
constructing the PSUV, building left currents within the party against more 
bureaucratic, opportunistic and right-wing components. The Assembly of 
Socialists (AS), for example, managed to congeal more than 20 
revolutionary organizations in November 2006.  Another revolutionary 
current within the PSUV is Marea Socialista, or Socialist Wave, formed by 
leftists of a Trotskyist background who were formerly involved in the Party 
of Revolution and Socialism, and heavily influential within the UNT 
(Fuentes 2008).  
 The party’s congress in March 2008 illustrated the depth of 
seriousness with which conservative and bureaucratic layers within the 
Chavismo sought to domesticate and control the party’s formation, 
program, and trajectory. Fernando Esteban describes some of the early 
setbacks with regard to electing the party leadership: 
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The first stage consisted of designating the members who had the right to vote. 
Out of 5 million members, only 80,000 could vote, without anyone knowing on 
what criteria this choice was based. In a second stage, once the 35 members of 
the national leadership had been elected, Chávez designated on live TV the 
members of the political bureau. There you can only find members of the 
government, and there are not representatives of the social or trade-union 
movement (Esteban 2008). 
Yet there continues to be space in the party for the revolutionary Left and 
its attempts to roll back corruption, bureaucracy, and alliances with the so-
called national bourgeoisie. 
 Militants of the Socialist Wave defend their participation within 
PSUV, refusing relegatie themselves at the extreme margins of the principal 
popular struggle occurring in the country, a struggle likely to determine 
the country’s trajectory. By actively participating in assemblies, presenting 
radical proposals, responding to the interests of the rank and file, and 
uniting with other left currents they hope to contribute to the 
radicalization of PSUV, turning it in an explicitly anti-capitalist direction 
and protecting the party against top-down, bureaucratic, and even 
militaristic, lines of hierarchy and control (Peres Borges, García and Vivas 
2008). The ultimate fate of the Venezuelan experiment will be the balance 
of forces within chavismo, between those in favour of democratic 
revolutionary socialism from below, and those bureaucratizing the process 
and cementing their privileges from above.  
 
Social Indicators and the Economy 
The social advances of the Bolivarian process are important. According to 
the latest figures from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Venezuela reduced its poverty and extreme 
poverty rates from 48.6 and 22.2 percent of the population respectively in 
2002, to 28.5 and 8.5 percent by 2007 (CEPAL 2008, 16).  The proportion 
of people living in poverty fell from 48.6 percent in 2002, to 30.2 percent in 
2006, down to 28.5 percent in 2007. In 2006 alone, as a consequence of 
sharp surges in social spending, the poverty rate fell from 37.1 percent to 
30.2 percent (CEPAL 2007, 18).  
 Yet, these trends are typical advances of centre-left regimes 
elsewhere in the region over the same period, a consequence of the 
conjunctural primary commodity boom in Latin America between 2003 
and 2007. For example, the urban areas of Argentina under the Nestor 
Kirchner’s government registered a decline in poverty and extreme 
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poverty from 45.4 and 20.9 percent respectively in 2002, to 21 and 7.2 
percent in 2006. In 2000, Chile had a poverty rate of 20.2 percent, while 
the extreme poverty level was 5.6 percent. By 2006, those figures had 
fallen to 13.7 and 3.2 percent respectively. What is more, Venezuela’s 
poverty rate of 28.5 percent in 2007 continues to compare poorly to Chile’s 
13.7 (2006), Costa Rica’s 18.6 (2007), and Uruguay’s 18.1 (2007) (CEPAL 
2008, 16). 
 Nonetheless, the Venezuelan figures, because they only measure 
income poverty, substantially underestimate the Chávez administration’s 
advances in poverty reduction more broadly through large-scale 
improvements in the social wage of the working class, i.e., social services. 
Various mission programs, that bypass bureaucratic and uncooperative 
state structures, are the principal means of delivering these social services. 
Barrio Adentro provides free health care to the poor through the assistance 
of tens of thousands of Cuban doctors and the establishment of new 
community clinics; Mercal is a state distributor of food at subsidized prices; 
Robinson 1 and 2 are missions focusing on literacy and primary education 
for adults; Ribas and Sucre target secondary and university education for 
individuals who never had the opportunity to attend or those who dropped 
out; and Vuelvan Caras provides state-funded training for employment and 
the creation of workers’ cooperatives (López Maya 2007, 165). 
 Some results are impressive. In 2005, for example, UNESCO 
declared that Venezuela was ‘a territory freed from illiteracy’ (Esteban 
2008). The figures on health care are also remarkable: 
In 1998 there were 1, 628 primary care physicians for a population of 23.4 
million. Today, there are 19,571 for a population of 27 million. In 1998 there 
were 417 emergency rooms, 74 rehab centers and 1,628 primary care centers 
compared to 721 emergency rooms, 445 rehab centers, and 8,621 primary care 
centers (including the 6,500 ‘check-up points’, usually in poor neighbourhoods, 
and that are in the process of being expanded to more comprehensive care 
centers) today. Since 2004, 399,662 people have had antiretroviral treatment 
from the government, compared to 18,538 in 2006 (Weisbrot and Sandoval 
2007, 9). 
This spending is contingent on massive oil rents unique to Venezuela in the 
Latin American and Caribbean context. From the first quarter of 2003, 
following the end of the oil lockout, to the second quarter of 2008, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew 94.7 percent, an incredible annual rate of 
13.5 percent (Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval, 2009, 6).  
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 Social democratic commentators emphasize that ‘in spite of the 
expansion of government during the Chávez years, the private sector has 
grown faster than the public sector,’ with finance and insurance at the 
leading edge (Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 2009, 7). Absolute figures for 
social spending have been very high, but public social spending as a 
percentage of gross national product has not been impressive relative to 
the rest of Latin America. In the year 2004-2005, for example, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Cuba, all showed higher 
rates of public social spending as a percentage of gross national product 
than Venezuela (CEPAL 2007, 132). 
 From the time the Chavistas came to power until 2002, the share of 
national income going to the richest 10 percent of the population fell 
minimally, while the share going to the bottom 40 percent decreased 
marginally. In 1999 the richest 10 percent of the population received 31.4 
percent of national income and in 2002, 31.3 percent. Meanwhile, the 
poorest 40 percent received only 14.5 percent of the national income in 
1999 and by 2002, just 14.3 percent.  
 This situation has since improved, but there has hardly been a 
revolutionary wealth transfer. Income inequality as measured by the Gini 
index fell from 46.96 to 40.99 between 1999 and 2008. As a comparison, 
between 1980 and 2005 the United States experienced an accelerated 
concentration of wealth upwards, from 40.3 to 46.9 as measured by the 
Gini index (Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 2009, 10). Between 2002 and 2007 
the share of income going to the bottom 40 percent of households rose to 
18.4 from 14.3 percent, and the share going to the top 10 percent of 
households fell from 31.3 to 25.7 (CEPAL 2008, 231). In 2007, across Latin 
American countries, the poorest 40 percent of households on average 
received 15 percent of total income, and only in Uruguay did they receive 
more than 20 percent (CEPAL 2008, 75).  Venezuela is now better than 
average in Latin America, but this is a region with the worst income 
inequality in the world.  
 Huge concentrations of personal wealth and privilege remain 
untouched by the Bolivarian process. Almost 30 percent of the population 
live in poverty by ECLAC’s measurements, which underestimate poverty. 
As one analyst suggests, ‘Any serious attempt to make Venezuelan society 
more egalitarian – let alone socialist – would begin with a radically 
progressive tax system aimed at redistributing wealth’ (Sustar 2007, 24). 
How this might be done has become radically more complex in a ravaged 
global economy. 
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The Global Crisis and Venezuela 
By April 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that we 
were witnessing the largest financial crisis in the United States since the 
Great Depression. However, as David McNally has observed, this 
underestimated the scale of the crisis. First, while originating in the United 
States, the crisis is global. Second, the crisis is no longer narrowly financial, 
but deeply impacting the ‘real economy’. ‘Having started in the 
construction-, auto- and electronics-sectors,’ he observes, ‘the slump is 
now sweeping through all manufacturing industries and spilling across the 
service-sector’ (McNally 2009, 36). Bankruptcies, factory closures and 
layoffs are a response to overaccumulation – over 250,000 jobs have been 
lost in the North American automobile industry alone. Waves of 
downsizing in non-financial corporations feed the underconsumption 
dynamic of this crisis. ‘As world demand and world-sales dive,’ McNally 
points out, ‘the effects of overcapacity (factories, machines, buildings that 
cannot be profitably utilized), which have been masked by credit-creation 
over the past decade, will kick in with a vengeance’ (McNally 2009, 37). 
Typically for the world capitalist system, we are increasingly witnessing 
the ‘geographical displacement of crisis: attempting to offload the worst 
impacts onto those outside the core’ (Hanieh 2009, 61). 
 From the vantage point of mid-2009, the suggestion of Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, that the crisis would not seriously affect 
Latin America appears deeply naïve (Cárdenas 2008). The slowdown of the 
2003-2007 commodity-driven boom deepened in Latin America over the 
first two quarters of 2008, sharpening severely since. Most economists 
now predict that ‘Latin America will be the region hardest hit in the 
developing world, with the exception of Central and Eastern Europe, both 
in terms of reductions in per capita GDP and slower growth vis-à-vis the 
boom years’ (Ocampo 2009, 705). The significant accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves and reduction of dollar-denominated public debt during 
the boom years provided a temporary cushioning of the global crisis in 
Latin America, but this situation is unlikely to matter if the world recession 
turns into a prolonged slump. ‘The budget surpluses are temporary 
stopgaps to finance some stimulus packages’, James Petras notes, ‘but they 
are totally insufficient to reverse the fall in all export sectors, the drying up 
of private credit and the drying up of new local/foreign investment. In fact 
the first sign and substance of growing recessionary tendencies is the large 
outflows of capital by investors anticipating the crisis’ (Petras 2009).  
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 The drop in world trade had already made itself felt by mid-2008; 
and then commodity prices simply collapsed after September of the same 
year. Export revenues for the region contracted at an annualized rate of 30 
percent in the final quarter of 2008, having a severe impact on GDP growth 
(Ocampo 2009, 708). The effects of collapsing remittance flows have been 
uneven across different Latin American countries based on fragmentary 
evidence, but are likely to inflict increasing pain on the popular classes 
over time as right-wing fueled xenophobia, ‘draconian restrictions on the 
movement of migrant-labour,’ and ‘tighter control and regulation of the 
movement of labour’ in the countries of the Global North deepen and 
expand (McNally 2009, 78; Hanieh 2009: 73).  
 In Venezuela, the plunge in energy prices has been the most 
important element of the crisis. Oil accounts for 90 percent of the country’s 
exports and more than half of government revenues (The Economist, 2008; 
Mander 2008). In July 2008, crude had reached the remarkable world 
market price of $US 147 per barrel. By December that year it collapsed to 
just $US 32.40. In 2009 it slowly rose back to $US 73 in early June 2009 
amidst mainstream-economist optimism regarding so-called ‘green shoots’ 
in the world economy, and Chinese strategic stockpiling. As stunningly bad 
US job figures came out later that month, however, the green shoots wilted, 
and oil prices fell to $US 66 (McCarthy 2009). The immediate fall in 
revenues for the Venezuelan government potentially threatens many social 
programs domestically and abroad; 
 Yet, this is an opportune moment for the Venezuelan process to 
reconcile its most profound internal contradictions, pushed by organized 
socialists in the labour movement, radical social movements of the urban 
poor, and radical currents within the PSUV itself. Until now, oil rents have 
lubricated a system of moderate redistribution to the popular classes 
without serious attack on the concentrated assets of a tiny elite and the 
ongoing expansion of the private sector. To defend and expand social 
programs, and to move forward with a multifaceted transition to socialism, 
a radical new wave of class struggle from below will be required. This 
struggle will face opposition from the right, which will use the crisis to seek 
to destabilize the Chávez regime, with the assistance of imperialist powers. 
Within Chavismo, bureaucratic conservative layers will defend a state-
capitalist response to exiting the crisis, rather than deepening shifts 
toward a transition to socialism. 
 The Venezuelan internal struggles will have repercussions for the 
Latin American Left. The bold revitalization of ALBA, as a means of 
deepening South-South links throughout Latin America will require 
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Venezuela’s lead. Whether projects like Banco del Sur (Bank of the South) 
take on socialist forms, such as providing funds to finance land reform and 
improvements in the lives of the popular classes region-wide, or whether 
reforms will subsidize the survival of local ruling classes to improve their 
chances of competing with international rivals, will ultimately depend on 
the trajectory of class struggle, not least in Venezuela (Katz 2009).  
 Neoliberal ideology suffered massive setbacks in Latin America 
during the last major regional recession (1998-2002), and during the 
uptick in radical popular movements between 2000 and 2005.17 With the 
rise of different centre-left governments in much of the region, social 
movements have subsequently subsided, with some having been co-opted 
into state machinery. At the same time, the extreme right holds onto power 
in countries like Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
 The Left internationally has a responsibility to expose the failings of 
the global capitalist system, but the Latin American Left in particular has 
the most potential to seize the moment, given the expansion and 
consolidation of anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist consciousness among 
much of the population over the last decade. A subjective shift from anti-
neoliberalism and anti-imperialism toward revolutionary socialism from 
below is the urgent necessity of the day (Katz 2007). ‘The current gap 
between favourable objective economic condition,’ Petras suggests, ‘and 
the under-development of (subjective) revolutionary socialist 
consciousness is probably a temporary phenomena: The ‘lag’ can be 
overcome by the direct intervention of conscious socialist political 
formations deeply inserted in everyday struggles capable of linking 
economic conditions to political action’ (Petras 2009). 
 The Bolivarian Revolutionary process must be defended against 
imperialism, particularly through solidarity with independent labour and 
popular community movements of the urban and rural poor that insist that 
authentic socialism comes from below, from the exploited and oppressed 
themselves. Support must be given to those who defend Chávez against 
each and every imperialist and counter-revolutionary measure, but who 
never hesitate to organize beyond the horizons of the conservative and 
bureaucratic layers within Chavismo; who denounce government 
capitulations to the interests of domestic and foreign capital; who insist on 
the independence of the working class from state control; and who call for 
a thoroughgoing transition to a profoundly democratic socialism, rooted in 
the social ownership of the means of production, worker and community 
                                                 
17
 See, among many others, Robinson, 2008. 
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 6(1) Spring 2010: 11-44 
 
 
control and self-management in all the spheres of social, political, and 
economic life, and the democratic social coordination of the economy. 
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